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We study the effects of discounting in a standard endogenous price leadership model. We show
that there will be occasional changes in the identity of the leader with any cost of delay or
discounting, however small. By analyzing the incentives that induce a firm to take up the leader
position, we derive positive predictions about which firm will lead most price changes. Firms with
shorter reaction times will be more likely to become the price leader, as will firms with lower cost of
delay if the firms’ reaction times are similar.
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1. Introduction
Case studies find that in a wide variety of oligopolistic industries, such as the cigarette,
steel, automobile, ready-to-eat-cereal and gasoline industries, new price announcements
arrive in a sequential manner: price increases by one firm are followed immediately by its
rivals. Compared with simultaneous price competition, this leader–follower time pattern
of pricing typically yields higher prices for both the leader and the follower firm. Hence, it
is difficult for regulatory authorities to distinguish collusive price leadership from a
leader–follower pattern that emerges as a noncooperative equilibrium outcome.
This paper inquires into the types of outcomes that are likely to arise as the result of
noncooperative competition between similar, symmetrically informed firms.1 First, we0167-7187/$ - see front matter D 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.05.001
* Corresponding authors.
E-mail addresses: Ivan.Pastine@ucd.ie (I. Pastine), Tuvana.Pastine@may.ie (T. Pastine).
1 Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) and Eckard (1982) analyze the role of informational asymmetries in
endogenous price leadership.
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leader. A leader–follower pattern where a single firm consistently leads all price changes
is unlikely if firms face a cost of delay in their price announcements. Secondly, by
analyzing the incentives that induce a firm to take up the leader position, we derive
positive predictions about which firm will lead most price changes.
In many industries, empirical studies by Scherer and Ross (1990), Nicholls (1951) and
Markham (1951) show that the identity of the leader tends to vary. One of the
‘‘distinguishing characteristics’’ of price leadership in industries that do not have a
dominant firm is occasional changes in the identity of the leader firm (Scherer and Ross,
1990, p. 249). For instance, in the US cigarette industry from 1923 to 1941, there were
eight standard brand price changes. While Reynolds lead six of these price changes,
American led the other two price changes. In the 1960s steel industry, price leadership
passed from one company to another with price changes being announced in different
product lines. Markham (1951) reports that in the newsprint industry, while International
Paper led most price changes in markets east of the Rocky Mountains, it did not lead all of
the price changes. Likewise, Crown Zellerbach has usually announced new prices on the
West Coast, but its rivals lead some price changes as well.
There is a line of research which derives predictions about which firm will become the
price leader. Among these, Van Damme and Hurkens (1998) show that an equilibrium
refinement (risk dominance) will pick the low-cost firm as the price leader no matter how
similar the firms might be, as long as they are not identical. In Deneckere and Kovenock
(1992) and Deneckere et al. (1992), differences in capacity constraints and brand loyalty
can generate an endogenous price leader as a result of a pure-strategy equilibrium. The
findings of our paper, on the other hand, predict occasional changes in the identity of the
leader. The reasons for the difference in these predictions are twofold: we explicitly
incorporate a cost of delay in price announcements and we allow the firms to act whenever
they wish.
When firms are restricted in the timing of their moves, such that in odd periods one firm
can announce price and in even periods the other firm can announce price, Deneckere and
Kovenock (1992) and Deneckere et al. (1992) show that the high capacity firm and/or the
firm with a greater brand-loyal group of consumers will emerge as the endogenous price
leader. However, as also noted in Deneckere and Kovenock (1992), relaxing the restriction
on the timing of the moves such that each firm can move in any period, endogenous price
leadership as a pure-strategy equilibrium outcome disappears when firms discount the
future. Our framework extends the endogenous leadership discussion by examining the
nature of the competition under these circumstances.
We argue that a cost of delay in price announcement may play an important role in
firms’ strategic pricing decisions. A firm can collect sales receipts at the new prices only
after having announced its price. Hence, a delay in the price announcement will inevitably
result in delayed and, therefore, discounted profits for the firm. When firms incur any cost
of delay in price announcements, however small, a leader–follower pattern cannot emerge
as a result of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Hence, we examine the mixed-strategy equilibria. In price competition, the mixed-
strategy equilibrium is a war of attrition. Due to the basic conflict over role selection,
firms struggle to capture the advantageous follower position. In the war of attrition,
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Therefore, while one firm might lead many price changes, the same firm will not lead
all price changes.2. A standard model of endogenous price leadership
Consider a duopolistic market with differentiated products where risk-neutral, profit-
maximizing firms, A and B compete in prices.2 There are two periods, and each firm must
make a price commitment either in period one or in period two.3 In period one, firms
simultaneously decide whether or not to commit and if so, what price to commit to, not
observing each other’s decision. If the firm waits and its rival commits, the firm can
observe rival’s commitment price while setting its price in the second period. If both firms
wait, they set their prices simultaneously in period two. Consumers make their purchasing
decisions as soon as both firms announce their prices. This framework corresponds to the
extended game with action commitment model of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) which has
been widely used to study endogenous price leadership.4
Each firm has a twice differentiable, strictly concave profit function which is increasing
in the rival’s price. Given firm j’s price pj, firm i’s optimal price solves the first-order
condition BPiðpi; pjÞ=Bpi ¼ 0, where i,ja{A,B}, i p j. These equations implicitly define
reaction functions, pi =Ri( pj) which are assumed to be upward-sloping.
5 It is also assumed
that there exists a unique and stable set of ‘‘simultaneous’’ prices where the reaction
functions cross, pi
S =Ri( pj
S).6 The profit functions evaluated at these simultaneous prices
are denoted by Pi
S, ia{A,B}. The profit of firm i when it is the leader is given by
Pi( pi,Rj( pi)), which is assumed to be strictly concave. The optimal ‘‘leadership’’ price is
denoted by pi
L. The reaction function of the follower firm j, evaluated at pi
L yields firm j’s
optimal ‘‘follower’’ price, pj
F =Rj( pi
L). The optimized leadership profit Pi( pi
L,pj
F) is
denoted by Pi
L.7 The optimized follower profit Pj( pi
L,pj
F) is denoted by Pj
F.2 Holthausen (1979) stresses the importance of the degree of risk aversion in endogenous price leadership
models.
3 In this paper, we will follow much of the endogenous leadership literature in assuming that firms are able to
credibly commit to their prices. Once a firm announces its price, it cannot change it. While this is a common
assumption in the literature, it does imply that the framework is far from a complete characterization of the firms’
strategic problem. More work needs to be done to understand how firms may address the commitment problem.
Not only is this an important issue in its own right, but the way in which firms attempt to commit may also affect
the nature of the competition between them and, hence, their struggle over leader and follower roles. Work by
Henkel (1999) shows one method of endogenizing the commitment level.
4 See Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) for a formal definition of the game. See also Amir (1995).
5 Upward-sloping reaction functions, which are typically assumed in price competition, require that the cross
partial derivatives of the profit functions are positive.
6 Stability implies that at the simultaneous prices ðBRB=BpAÞ < 1=ðBRA=BpBÞ:
7 When the leadership first-order condition, ðBPi=BpiÞ þ ðBPi=BpjÞðBRj=BpiÞ ¼ 0 , is evaluated at the
simultaneous price, the left-hand side is positive since the profit function is increasing in the rival’s price, and the
reaction function is positively sloped. Therefore, pi
L>pi
S. While the leader firm has the option of quoting its
simultaneous price and receiving its simultaneous profit, it will not choose to do so, hence, Pi
L>Pi
S.
I. Pastine, T. Pastine / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 22 (2004) 135–145138For the purpose of this paper, we will define a leader–follower outcome to be any
outcome that may possibly help to explain the empirically observed phenomenon of price
leadership. That is any outcome where one firm announces its price first and the other
announces its price an observable (nonzero) amount of time after the leader. A leader–
follower equilibrium will be any equilibrium which yields a nonzero probability of a
leader–follower outcome. In the context of this two-period discrete-time model, a leader–
follower outcome would involve one firm moving in period one and the other moving in
period two.
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, Theorem VII) show that in this framework, multiple
subgame-perfect, pure-strategy leader–follower Nash equilibria exist including each firm
waiting and the other playing its Stackelberg leader price in the first period.
In Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), firms do not discount the future, and they do not face
a cost of delay in their price announcements. However, costs of delay arise naturally in
price announcement games. Firms will not receive the benefit of new prices until they
announce their price, in which case discounting will introduce a cost of delay.
Additionally, firms may incur costs due to foregone sales in the face of late price quotations.
When consumers are unable to preplan due to lack of information about price, demand may
decrease.
In fact, pure-strategy, leader–follower equilibria disappear if firms incur any cost of
delay in price announcements, however small the cost might be.8 When i expects j to
commit to pj in period one, it is in i’s best interest to quote Ri( pj). With any cost of delay,
however small, i strictly prefers to quote Ri( pj) in period one rather than in period two,
since it can capture the same profit in the first period and avoid the cost of delay. Hence, j
leading and i following is not an equilibrium when firms face a cost of delay, however
small the cost of delay. This result suggests that the conclusions of the pure-strategy
leader–follower equilibria are unlikely to be a convincing explanation for most observed
price leadership.
Nevertheless, empirical observations suggest that price leadership is quite common.
One reasonable interpretation could be that firms are playing a mixed-strategy equilibrium,
randomizing between committing early and waiting to announce price.9 In this context, it
would be intuitively appealing. Dowrick (1986) shows that both firms will typically prefer
to be the follower to being the leader in price competition when firms have upward-sloping
reaction functions.10 Dowrick notes that it may also be possible for firms with sufficiently
dissimilar profit functions to agree on the choice of roles. We will concentrate on the cases
where firms are not too dissimilar, so there is an element of conflict in role selection. We
restrict attention to the set of profit function pairs which yield leadership prices above the
follower prices, pi
L>pi
F. Since, by definition, a firm’s follower price is its best response to8 See Deneckere and Kovenock (1992, footnote 12). In Robson (1990), sales take place at the deadline, no
matter how early the firms might announce their prices. Since there is no cost of delay in price announcements in
his framework, Robson finds that there are multiple pure-strategy leader– follower equilibria.
9 The literature has noted the possibility of such an equilibrium (see Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990; Robson,
1990; Deneckere and Kovenock, 1992).
10 In addition, see Gal-Or (1985). Amir and Grilo (1999), Boyer and Moreaux (1987) and Ono (1982)
discuss closely related questions.
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F,pj
L)zPi( pi
L,pj
L). And since the profit function
is increasing in the rival’s price, Pi( pi
L,pj
L)>Pi( pi
L,pj
F). Therefore, both firms will want to
capture the follower position. In this case, a mixed-strategy equilibrium could be
interpreted as the ‘‘chicken’’ variation of the war of attrition.11
However, below we show that in this framework a nondegenerate, mixed-strategy
equilibrium does not exist. Thus, with a cost of delay, there is no equilibrium which yields
any chance of a leader–follower outcome.
Proposition 1: With a cost of delay, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium involves
immediate and simultaneous moves in the first period.
See proof in Appendix A.3. Relaxing the restrictions on the timing of firms’ moves
The framework presented in the previous section of the paper permits direct compar-
ison of the results with the existing literature on endogenous leadership. The introduction
of a cost of delay in price announcements, however small, is shown to change the
predictions of the model: a leader–follower outcome cannot occur as the result of a
noncooperative equilibrium. However, under this specification the framework no longer
has explanatory power for observed price leadership. Since a cost of delay in price
announcement games is quite a realistic assumption, how can we reconcile theory and
empirical observation?
A number of restrictions on the timing of firms’ moves are embedded in the two-
period, discrete-time framework. A firm that delays must wait an entire period before it
announces its price and the firms are not permitted to delay past period two. In this
section, we relax these assumptions and allow the firms to announce their prices whenever
they wish. We show that when these restrictions are relaxed, the theory does generate
endogenous leadership and we can make positive predictions about the identity of the
leader firm.
Thus, we look at an infinite-horizon, continuous-time version of the model. As before,
the game ends as soon as both firms make their price announcements, and each firm
receives profits which depend on prices as specified in Section 2. In this price
announcement game, the continuous-time formulation has two advantages. First, the
continuous-time framework allows the firms to act whenever they wish, avoiding arbitrary
restrictions on the timing of their actions. Secondly, the equilibrium that yields interesting
predictions in the framework without a deadline will prove to be in mixed strategies and,
hence, the continuous-time formulation is technically convenient. However, in continuous
time when firms can respond instantaneously, leader–follower outcomes are observation-
ally indistinguishable from simultaneous price announcements. In reality, firms are11 In the classic game of chicken, two cars drive toward a cliff and the first driver to turn away loses (captures
the leader profit) while his rival wins (captures the follower profit). However, if neither driver turns away, they
drive over the cliff (engage in simultaneous price competition).
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evidence of price leadership. To match this reality, we will assume that it takes a fixed time
to react to the rival’s actions. In the previous section, the assumption of a minimum
response time was already embedded in the discrete-time setting.12 Hence, in this section,
we will keep the reaction lag spirit of the discrete-time framework, but allow the firms to
act whenever they wish by moving to continuous time.
The actions of the rival are immediately observable but it takes firm i a fixed length
of time mi>0 to react to the actions of its rival. That is, if firm i wishes to adopt a
strategy that conditions its price announcement on its rival’s price, then the firm’s
announcement must occur at least mi after its rival’s announcement. The firm still has
the option of announcing its price earlier, but if it does so then its price cannot be
conditional on its rival’s price. Sales take place only after both firms have announced
their prices. We incorporate a cost of delay in price announcements via discounting.
Firms discount the future at the rate ria(0,l), ia{A,B}. Since pi
F is the optimal reaction
to pj
L, it is always true that Pi( pi
L,pj
L) <Pi( pi
F,pj
L). We will assume that firms’ reaction
time is short enough that it does not change this basic incentive of the firms to capture
the follower position: PiðpLi ; pLj Þ<e miriPiðpFi ; pLj Þ:
Attention is restricted to subgame-perfect equilibria. Simultaneous announcement of pA
S
and pB
S is an equilibrium outcome in this model for the same reason as it was in the two-
period discrete-time model. Of interest here is what types of leader–follower outcomes are
possible.
Proposition 2: Subgame-perfect leader–follower equilibria can only arise due to a mixed-
strategy equilibrium where firms randomize over their price-announcement times. There
exists such an equilibrium where the price announcement time for firm j, conditional on no
price announcement by firm i, has an exponential distribution with p.d.f. qje
 qjt, for tz 0,
where qj ¼fð riPLi Þ =ðPFi eðmj  mi Þ ri  PLi Þg is the hazard rate, i,ja{A, B}, i p j.
Proof: Define zi and zj as the deterministic price-announcement times that result from pure
strategies si and sj. Without loss of generality, assume that ziV zj. If zj>zi + e, then sj cannot
be optimal given si since firm j would strictly prefer to make its price announcement at zi,
avoiding the cost of delay. If zj is in the open interval around zi, then zj< zi +mj so j’s price
cannot be conditional on i’s price. Thus, both firms must be on their reaction functions
yielding price announcements of pi
S =Ri( pj
S) and pj
S =Rj( pi
S), an equilibrium which is
observationally equivalent to simultaneous price competition. Leader–follower outcomes
cannot arise as the result of pure-strategy equilibria.
The strictly concave profit functions imply that the firms will never mix in prices.
Consider a possible stationary mixed-strategy equilibrium with behavior strategies for
each firm j of the form: ‘‘If neither firm has announced price by time s, then announce pj
L
at s with probability qj. If i announced price at time s and j did not, then announce
pj=Rj( pi) at time s +mj.’’ If these strategies form a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the
probabilities qA and qB are such that each firm is indifferent between committing to its12 See Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) for a comparison of games in discrete time versus continuous time
and for a clear discussion on the ‘‘length of reaction’’in these two frameworks.
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commits. For small dt, the probability that firm j announces its price in the interval [s,s + dt]
can be approximated by qjdt, and this indifference becomes:
PLi e
mjri ¼ ½qjdt	PFi eðmiþdtÞri þ ½1 qjdt	PLi eðmjþdtÞri ð1Þ
The left-hand side gives i’s payoff from committing. Since sales take place once both firms
have announced price, the leader profit is received when the rival reacts. Hence, the profit is
discounted by e mjri. The right-hand side gives the expected payoff from waiting a short
time dt. With probability qjdt, the rival will commit in this interval. The firm would then
follow mi later, and receive the discounted follower profit. With a probability (1 qjdt),
however the rival will wait, in which case the firm will get the discounted continuation
value of the game. Since the equilibrium is stationary and the firm is indifferent between
leading and waiting at each point in time, the continuation value is equal to Pi
Le mjri.
Solving Eq. (1) for qj and letting dt! 0 yields the qj that makes firm i indifferent between
committing and waiting an instant to announce price:
qj ¼ riP
L
i
PFi e
ðmjmiÞri  PLi
b i; jafA;Bg i p j ð2Þ
This is positive and exists so the proposed strategies do form an equilibrium. This mixed-
strategy equilibrium is subgame perfect: at any point in time where neither firm has
announced price, the firms’ problem is the same and they will be willing to choose the
same strategies. 5
In markets where firms face any cost of delay, however small, leader–follower
outcomes can only occur as the result of a mixed-strategy equilibrium. This mixed-
strategy equilibrium takes the natural interpretation of a war of attrition. Since each firm
prefers the follower position, the disagreement over roles leads to a struggle as each firm
tries to gain the more profitable position. Each firm would like to wait to quote price with
the hope of getting the rival to announce price early. However, each firm would consider
moving early and accepting the leader profit in order to avoid the cost of delay in the event
that the rival waits as well.
The probabilities in Eq. (2) have the familiar properties of mixed-strategy equilibria. As
the benefit of a position to a firm increases, so does the probability that its rival captures
that position. However, unlike in many mixed-strategy equilibria, here a firm’s probability
of moving depends on the cost and demand conditions of both firms. While qj is a function
of its rival’s profits, Pi
L and Pi
F, these depend on both firms’ leader and follower prices
which are chosen strategically and, hence, depend on the cost and demand conditions
facing both firms.
Notice that firms would face the same incentives if they had existing prices as long as
their flow profits from these existing prices were less than the flow profits as a price leader.
Suppose that xi
j is the present value of firm i’s flow profits over the intervalmj at the existing
prices and redefine Pi
L and Pi
F as the present value of the infinite stream of profits as a
leader or follower respectively. If sales at the new prices take place once both firms have
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j while
the right-hand side will go up by [ qjdt]xi
i+[1 qjdt]xij. If m is small for both firms, the
values xi
i and xi
j are small, and the basic problem is unchanged: if both mA and mB! 0,
the resulting equilibrium probabilities would approach those found in Proposition 2.
However, if sales at a new price start taking place the moment the new price is announced,
then the firms will have to take into account the fact that their choice of price will affect
the profits they receive in the interval m, the amount of time the rival needs to react. These
profits and, hence, the choice of leader price and probability of leading, will depend on
the initial price of the rival. Nevertheless, if both firms’ reaction times are small the
relative importance of these profits while waiting for the rival to react will be small, and
the basic nature of the game will be unchanged.4. Discussion
In the war of attrition, equilibrium differences between the firms translate into
asymmetric probabilities of announcing price (Eq. (2)). When firms have identical
discount rates and reaction times, the war of attrition equilibrium implies that the firm
with the relatively high follower/leader profit ratio (PF/PL) will tend to lead more often.
While this ratio appears fairly often in the endogenous leadership literature, to date there
are no general results on how different factors influence it.13
Firms may have different organizational structures that yield different speed of reaction.
An increase in mi will decrease qi and increase qj. Hence, the firm with the shorter reaction
time will be more likely to become the price leader. This result is interesting to compare to
the results found in work on informational asymmetries and endogenous price leadership,
Eckard (1982) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1990). These papers find that the firm with
better access to information will tend to be the price leader. The results here are similar, but
rather than the firms’ access to information it is the firms’ ability to react quickly to new
information that influences the probability of becoming the price leader.
Differences in the firms’ costs of delay will also result in differences in the probability
of becoming the price leader.
Bqj
Bri
¼ qj
riPLi
PLi  PFi qjðmj  miÞeðmjmiÞri
h i
ð3Þ
The direct effect of an increase in a firm’s cost of delay (the first term in the brackets of
Eq. (3)) is that ceteris paribus it finds waiting to be less attractive. Hence, in equilibrium13 The are specific examples, however. In Deneckere et al. (1992), as the firm with the larger segment of
brand loyal costumers increases its costumer base, the relative follower/leader profit ratio of the firm with a
smaller base goes down. In our framework as in theirs, this would imply a higher probability for the larger firm to
lead. In Deneckere and Kovenock (1992), the way the follower/leader profit ratio relates to the discount factor
yields different predictions on the identity of leader. However these examples are not directly comparable to our
model due to their discontinuous reaction functions and restriction on the timing of moves. There is a need in the
literature for further investigation of the determinants of the follower/leader profit ratio and search for more
general, unifying results on it.
I. Pastine, T. Pastine / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 22 (2004) 135–145 143the rival’s probability of moving early must increase, keeping it indifferent between
announcing its price and waiting. However, there is also an indirect effect (the second term
in the brackets of Eq. (3)). This arises if firms have different reaction times. Moving first
means that the firm will have to wait for its rival to react. If the rival moves first, the firm
will have to wait during its own reaction time. An increase in a firm’s cost of delay makes
the differences in reaction times more important in the firms decisions. If the rival’s
reaction time is greater than the firm’s (mj>mi), then this effect will make moving early
relatively less attractive and, hence, in equilibrium the rival’s probability of moving early
must decrease to compensate. One can come up with examples where the differences in the
firms’ reaction times are so large that as the firm’s cost of delay goes down the firm is less
likely to lead. Nevertheless, if the firms’ reaction times are not too dissimilar, then the firm
that is facing a lower cost of delay will be more likely to be the price leader. To the extent
that large firms have access to lower interest rates than smaller firms, which is often found
empirically,14 large firms would be more likely to lead price changes. This is the pattern
which is observed in many industries.155. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the types of leader–follower outcomes that are likely to arise as the
result of noncooperative competition between similar, symmetrically informed duopolistic
firms. If firms have any cost of delay, however small, all pure-strategy equilibria involve
simultaneous price announcements. However, when we allow firms to announce their
prices whenever they like there exists an equilibrium where both firms mix over the timing
of their moves and a leader–follower pattern in pricing may be observed. This mixed-
strategy equilibrium is a war of attrition, since both firms struggle to capture the follower
position. If this equilibrium is repeated for successive price changes, the paper predicts
occasional changes in the identity of the endogenous price leader. The probabilities that
each firm becomes the endogenous price leader are also derived.
As early as 1934, von Stackelberg argued that in oligopolistic markets, the conflict
between the firms over the leader and follower roles will lead to an unstable market, as
firms continually struggle to gain the advantageous position. ‘‘A regular trial of strength
emerges and no equilibrium position is reached. . .[The pure-strategy ‘‘Stackelberg’’
leader–follower] equilibrium is unstable, for the passive seller can always take up the
struggle again at any time. . .[E]ach duopolist tries in each case to induce his competitor to
adopt another behavior pattern so that he is forced to give in.’’ (Von Stackelberg, 1952,
p. 194). Likewise, in an influential paper, Markham (1951, p. 897) argued that ‘‘there are
certain visible market features associated with competitive price leadership.. . .[I]n the
absence of conspiracy one would certainly expect occasional changes in the identity of the
price leader.’’ The mixed-strategy equilibrium presented here is in line with the intuitive
arguments of von Stackelberg and Markham.14 See Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) for references to the empirical evidence. See Martinelli (1997) for a
theoretical explanation.
15 See Stigler (1947) for evidence from US industries.
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Proof of Proposition 1: As shown in the text, when there is a cost of delay, there is no
subgame-perfect, pure-strategy leader–follower equilibrium. Since the profit functions are
strictly concave, firms will never mix in prices. It remains to be shown then that there does
not exist an equilibrium where firms randomize over the timing of their price announce-
ments. Suppose there existed a nondegenerate mixed-strategy equilibrium where j commits
before the deadline with probability qja(0,1). Concavity of the profit functions implies that
the commitment price of i is unique. Denote it by pi
C. It solves the first-order condition:
qj
BPiðpi; pCj Þ
Bpi
" #
þ ð1 qjÞdi BPiðpi;RjðpiÞÞ
Bpi
þ BPiðpi;RjðpiÞÞ
Bpj
BRj
Bpi
 
¼ 0 ð4Þ
i,ja{A,B} and i p j. If pi
Cz pi
L, then the second bracketed term is nonpositive, since it is
equal to zero at pi
L. Therefore, the first bracketed term must be nonnegative, implying that
pi
CVRi( pj
C). pi
FuRi( pj
L) < pi
LV pi
CVRi( pj
C), so pi
Cz pi
L implies pj
C>pj
L. By the same
argument, this implies pj
C <Rj( pi
C). However, since simultaneous prices are unique and
stable, both pi
CVRi( pj
C) and pj
C <Rj( pi
C) are not possible when pi
C>pi
S and pj
C>pj
S. Hence, pi
C <
pi
L. If pi
CV pi
S, the second bracketed term is positive since pi
S < pi
L. Therefore, the first
bracketed term must be negative, implying pi
C>Ri( pj
C). pi
SuRi( pj
S)z pi
C>Ri( pj
C), so pi
CV pi
S
implies pj
C < pj
S. By the same argument, this implies pj
C>Rj( pi
C). However, since simul-
taneous prices are unique and stable, both pi
C>Ri( pj
C) and pj
C>Rj( pi
C) are not possible
when pi
CV pi
S and pj
CV pj
S. Hence, pi
Ca( pi
S,pi
L).16
If i waits until the second period, with probability qj, it captures the follower
position. With probability (1 qj), however, firms quote prices simultaneously in
period two. Therefore, i’s expected profit from waiting is,
qjPiðRiðpCj Þ; pCj Þ þ ð1 qjÞPSi ð5Þ
Firm i’s expected profit from quoting Ri( pj
C) in period one is,
qjPiðRiðpCj Þ; pCj Þ þ ð1 qjÞPiðRiðpCj Þ;RjðRiðpCj ÞÞÞ ð6Þ
Rj( pi
C)>pj
S since pi
C>pi
S, pj
S =Rj( pi
S) and Rj() is upward sloping. Rj( piC)V pjF since pjF =
Rj( pi
L) and pi
CV pi
L. Therefore, Rj( pi
C) < pj
L since pj
F < pj
L. Since the profit function is
increasing in the rival’s price and Pj( pj,Ri( pj)) is concave in pj, Pj( pj,Ri( pi))16 This was suggested in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).
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S,pj
L). Since Rj( p)a( pj
S,pj
L), Pj(Rj( pi
C), Ri(Rj( pi
C)))>
Pj( pj
S,pi
S). Thus Eq. (6)>Eq. (5), and firm i would always strictly prefer committing to
waiting, since it can avoid any chance of the low simultaneous profit in period two by
committing to the price Ri( pj
C) in period one. 5References
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